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I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
URNHAM v. Superior Court I is a case that will cause much concern
to proceduralists since it can be interpreted as either the signaling of a
trend away from the "minimum contacts" analysis of International
Shoe v. Washington,2 or a simple decision about transient jurisdiction limited
to the facts of Burnham.3 The case concerned a husband and wife who had
had a marital domicile in New Jersey. The husband remained in New Jersey
and agreed that the wife could have custody of the children and move with
them to California. The couple had agreed to obtain a divorce based on
irreconcilable differences, but because the husband did not live up to the
agreement, the wife brought suit for divorce in California. Shortly thereafter
the husband visited Southern California on business and then went to North-
ern California to visit his children. He took the older child for the weekend
to San Francisco.
As the father was returning the child, he was served with a California
court summons and a copy of his wife's divorce petition. He returned to
New Jersey, but later made a special appearance in the California Superior
Court in order to quash the service of process on the basis that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and the California
Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief.4 Although the United States
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment, there was considerable
disagreement among the Justices as to the basis for the decision.5
The husband claimed that California's exercise of jurisdiction denied him
due process because he lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the state
and had merely been physically present in the state at the time of service.
Justice Scalia wrote that a state could obtain jurisdiction over a physically
present defendant even if the defendant's presence was not related to the
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 2109.
5. Id. at 2107-09.
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cause of action. 6 He stated that his decision was based on "American tradi-
tion".7 Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but argued that all rules
of jurisdiction "must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.""
The Burnham decision is troubling because it arises in the family law con-
text and Justice Scalia appears to denigrate the importance of contacts be-
tween parent and child.9 In addition, he cites to Kulko v. Superior Court of
California,t0 but does not seem to take seriously the concern expressed in
that decision for reasonable visitation agreements."'
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight 12 the Court
held that a parent who refused to produce a child who had been adjudicated
in need of assistance, could not invoke the fifth amendment, 3 to protect her-
self from charges of contempt.' 4 The Court reasoned that under these cir-
cumstances the child was in his parent's custody subject to the state's
regulatory interests, and as such, the child was subject to inspection.' 5 The
Court did indicate that the fact that the child was subject to inspection and
therefore must be produced might also limit the extent to which the state
could use the testimonial fact of production in a criminal proceeding.' 6
The Court also rendered two decisions in connection with statutes requir-
ing that parents be notified before a minor could legally undergo an abor-
tion. 17 In each case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes.' 8
Of interest to family law practitioners is the long discussion in Hodgson of
the problems faced by single parent families. 19 If all the members of the
Court continue to read and consider materials concerning the realities of
family life in the United States today, one may hope that they will see the
folly inherent in basing their family law decisions on historical tradition. 20
6. Id. at 2111.
7. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (1990).
8. Id. at 2120.
9. Id. at 2118. In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, he boldly states that fairness is
lacking in Justice Brennan's due process and personal jurisdiction analysis. Id. Justice Scalia's
sarcastic comment concerning the implications of being subject to personal jurisdiction while
physically present in a state reflects his disapproval of Justice Brennan's analysis. Justice
Scalia asked "What if, for example, Mr. Burnham were visiting a sick child? Or a dying
child?" Id.
10. 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978).
11. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2118 (1990).
12. 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
14. Baltimore, 110 S. Ct. at 908.
15. 110 S. Ct. at 907.
16. Id. at 908-09.
17. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2948-49 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2983-84 (1990).
18. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2948-49; Akron, 110 S. Ct. at 2983-84.
19. 110 S. Ct. at 2938-44, 2950. The court notes that the two-parent notification require-
ment for a minor's abortion is particularly burdensome and emotionally disturbing when the
minor child has not maintained a close relationship with the absent parent. Id. at 2945, 2950.
20. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2343-45 (1989).
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II. STATUS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Fee v. Herndon,21 a case involving
allegedly excessive corporal punishment, continued to follow its holding in
Cunningham v. Beavers22 that no deprivation of substantive due process oc-
curred when there was an adequate state and criminal law remedy.23 Thus
the court sustained the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action even
though in this particular case the corporally punished student was a special
education student who thereafter required six months of hospitalization in a
psychiatric ward.24 The Fifth Circuit held further that under Texas law, a
teacher has no legal duty to intervene in corporal punishment administered
by a fellow educator.25 The court then stated that since there was a failure
to state a federal claim, the residual tort claim against the school principal
was properly remanded to state court.26
In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District27
the court permanently enjoined a urinalysis program for drugs in grades six
through twelve as a condition for students' participation in extracurricular
activities.28 The court held that such a program was a search,29 and relying
on an earlier Fifth Circuit decision30 in which dogs performed drug searches
by sniting students, held that the search must be objectively reasonable.31
The court then held the program unconstitutional, finding no justification
for the intrusion on the personal privacy of the school children. 32
In McNary v. Kahn 33 the court reversed a probate court's summary judg-
ment decision 34 and held that unresolved questions of fact concerning the
paternity of decedent's putative child existed.35 Relying on the 1987 amend-
ments to the probate code, the court held that there might be clear and con-
vincing evidence that the child in question was entitled to be treated as a
child of the decedent for purposes of inheritance.36
In In re George37 the Tyler appellate court held that a paternity action
21. 900 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1990).
22. 858 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1343 (1989).
23. Fee, 900 F.2d at 808.
24. Id. at 809-10. The court pointed out that the fact that causes of action brought under
42 U.S.C § 1983 entitled prevailing parties to receive attorneys' fees was irrelevant to the ques-
tion of adequate state relief. Id. at 809.
25. Id. at 811.
26. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1990).
27. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
28. Id. at 766.
29. Id. at 763; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384,
1390-91 (1989) (drug screening by urinalysis is an infringement on reasonable privacy expecta-
tions and thus a search under fourth amendment).
30. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982).
31. Brooks v. East Chamber Consol. Indep. School Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764 (S.D.
Tex. 1989).
32. Id. at 766.
33. 792 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
34. Id. at 128.
35. Id. at 127.
36. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
37. 794 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
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could not be brought under Chapter 13 of the Texas Family Code after the
alleged father's death.38 The court expressly declined to follow a decision of
the San Antonio court of appeals39 and held that the Probate Code con-
trolled intestate succession and provided sufficient remedies for possible ie-
gitimate heirs.4° In Dickson v. Simpson 4 1 the Austin court of appeals denied
an adult illegitimate child the opportunity to contest the will of her alleged
father because she had not established paternity before the running of the
general four year statute of limitations.42 The alleged father had died in
1985 and the court reasoned that the legislature, when providing new reme-
dies for illegitimate children, also intended to permit adults to enjoy a simi-
lar remedy of legitimation by court order.43 The legislature, while providing
a specific statute of limitations for children, did not provide a specific statute
of limitations for adults.
The court held that for adults the legislature's intent was that the four
year general statute of limitations apply, which in this case commenced in
1979, the time of the legislative enactment. 44 The court dismissed equal pro-
tection claims despite the fact that children who have claims for paternal
inheritance are treated differently from children with claims for maternal
inheritance.45 Based upon the 1987 amendment to the probate code section
at issue and, if the court's reasoning in Dickson holds, known adult illegiti-
mate children have a relatively short time remaining to assert their rights.46
In Ortega v. First Republic Bank Fort Worth 47 the Supreme Court of
Texas held that the 1963 decision in Martin v. Neel"4 was dispositive of the
rights of the adopted children to take as contingent remaindermen of a
trust.49 The Martin court had interpreted the words "including any other
great-grandchildren who may be born after my death" to exclude adopted
children. 50 Accordingly, the Ortega court held that the summary judgment
against the adopted children was correct based on res judicata. 51
In Villalpando v. De La Garza52 a defective special appearance by the
alleged father, a resident of Utah, gave the court personal jurisdiction53 and
enabled the court to hold on the basis of the evidence presented by the
38. Id. at 879.
39. Manuel v. Spector, 712 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ)
(paternity suit and blood testing under the Texas Family Code involve only the mother, alleged
father, and child).
40. In re George at 878.
41. 781 S.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ granted).
42. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
43. Dickson, 781 S.W.2d at 725.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 726-27.
46. See supra note 42.
47. 792 S.W.2d 452, 459 (Tex. 1990).
48. 379 S.W.2d 422, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd).
49. Ortega, 792 S.W.2d at 454-55.
50. Martin, 379 S.W.2d at 424.
51. Ortega, 792 S.W.2d at 456.
52. 793 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
53. Id. at 275-76.
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mother that he was in fact the father of the twin girls at issue.54 The father
had refused to cooperate in blood testing. The findinj of paternity permitted
the court to order the father to pay child support and attorneys fees.55
In Page v. Page56 the appellate court held that the trial court erred when it
granted the petitioner's request for a nonsuit and dismissed the entire lawsuit
despite the respondent's claims for affirmative relief.57 The petitioner filed a
petition for divorce on the basis of an alleged common law marriage and for
child support. The respondent denied both allegations. Four years after the
filing of the petition, the case went to trial. The court granted a nonsuit and
dismissed the respondents claims for attorneys' fees and costs, and for reim-
bursement of child support payments. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded for trial on the respondent's claims.58 The
respondent had also asked the appellate court to find that there was no com-
mon law marriage or paternity, but since these issues had never been consid-
ered by the trial court, the appellate court held such findings were beyond its
power.59
In Goheen v. Koester6° the issue concerned the retroactivity of child sup-
port for an illegitimate child. The unwed father filed a suit for voluntary
legitimation and possessory conservatorship. The mother then counter-
claimed for termination of the unwed father's rights and adoption by her
husband. The trial court established the father's paternity and granted him
visitation rights.61 The court ordered the father to pay child support back to
the date of the filing of the petition and to pay of future support, as well as
all the mother's attorneys' fees, and both sides appealed.62 The father
claimed that since he had obtained everything he wanted, (the mother had
requested support from the child's birthdate) he was the successful party and
should not have to pay the mother's attorneys fees. The court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees since it was
difficult in a case that resulted in child support orders to determine just who
was the successful party.63
The more difficult question was the date at which child support should
start. The court held that it would follow the reasoning of Adams v.Stotts64
that if a party was a parent at the time of judgment, that party was also a
parent at the time of birth.65 The court did not consider the changes made
by the legislature to have overturned its prior holding.66 The dissent dis-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278.
56. 780 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
57. Id. at 2-3.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id.
60. 794 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1990, no writ).
61. Id. at 831.
62. Id. at 832.
63. Id. at 836.
64. 667 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
65. Goheen, 794 S.W.2d at 834.
66. See Tex. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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agreed with the majority, finding that the legislature made the change to
limit a father's liability in order to encourage fathers to voluntarily legiti-
mate their children. 67
One Texas court ordered a mother to stop using her new husband's name
and to use the father's name when referring to their child's surname. The
appellate court held that the trial court was correct in its order since a father
had a protectible interest in having a child bear his surname.68 The court
further stated that the father had no burden to show harm; he merely had to
prove that the mother was not using his surname.69 The test under the
Texas Family Code when requesting a name change for a minor is the best
interest of the child, and the burden would be on the mother if she decided
to follow this route.70
III. CONSERVATORSHIP
In Davis v. Davis71 the Dallas court of appeals held that a visitation sched-
ule that markedly exceeded the Dallas County visitation guidelines was not a
de facto grant of managing conservatorship to the possessory conservator in
contravention of a jury verdict.72 The court noted that the managing con-
servator had rights and powers that were not granted to the possessory con-
servator. 73 The mother, however, did offer a unique argument. She claimed
that during much of the time accorded her, the child was either asleep or at
day-care, and thus she did not have quality time with the child. Although
she asserted that she had only three hours each weekday of available time,
her attorney later conceded that there was no known case law using this
distinction to determine visitation.74 The court also distinguished this case,
an original conservatorship determination, from all the cases cited by the
mother which were modification cases.75 The dissenting opinion com-
plained that the right to a trial by jury had been undermined.7 6
The court in 0. G. v. Baum 77 denied mandamus in a case involving the
possibility of a blood transfusion for a child of sixteen who was a Jehovah's
Witness. The court held that state and federal law were unsettled on the
issue of a 16-year-old's constitutional and common law rights to refuse a
blood transfusion.78 The court held further that because the blood transfu-
sion would be given only if absolutely necessary, the trial court had not
67. 794 S.W.2d at 838.
68. In re Griffiths, 780 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
69. Id.
70. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 32.04 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
71. 794 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
72. Id. at 935-36.
73. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
74. Davis, 794 S.W.2d at 934.
75. Id. at 936.
76. Id. at 937. In Rossen v. Rossen, 792 S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, no writ), the court affirmed a jury's verdict granting managing conservatorship to
the father.
77. 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, no writ).
78. Id. at 841-42.
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abused its discretion.79
A divided Texas Supreme Court in Lewelling v. Lewelling8 ° endeavored to
establish guidelines for following the amended statute that provided for a
strong parental preference in a conservatorship contest with a nonparent8 1
The court held that a nonparent, in order to prevail, would have to offer
evidence of specific acts or omissions by the parent that would result in phys-
ical or emotional harm to the child.82 The court also held that it would be
contrary to the public policy of Texas to deny custody to a parent because
that parent was a victim of spousal abuse.83 The court reversed and re-
manded the case to the trial court for hearings on child support and visita-
tion. 84 Justice Cook's concurrence pointed out that the legislature amended
the statute to establish a bright line test for the parental presumption.8 5
Justice Gonzalez dissented, contending that the best interest of the child
should still be the only test. 86 Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Spears, wrote
a separate dissenting opinion agreeing with the reasoning of the court's opin-
ion, but disagreeing with the judgment appointing the mother as managing
conservator.8 7 Both dissenting justices assumed, as did the majority, that
the child had been living with its paternal grandparents for the last two years
and a sudden change in households might not be in the child's best
interest.88
In Petru v. Bass89 the Houston court of appeals held that a temporary
restraining order was not a prior court order under the Family Code. 90 The
court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a father so that he could take pos-
session of his child from its maternal grandparents although the child had
been living with them for two years.91
In Weimer v. Weimer 92 a father lost a petition for a change in custody in a
default judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by striking his pleadings as an abuse of discovery sanction and
rendering judgment against him.93 The court found that the mother was not
a bad parent and that the father had not met the burden of proving that a
change in custody would be in the children's best interest.94 In another case
where the father sought to become managing conservator based on allega-
tions of sexual abuse, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial be-
79. Id. at 842.
80. 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990).
81. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
82. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 168-69.
85. Id. at 169.
86. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 170, 173 (Tex. 1990).
87. Id. at 174-75.
88. Id.
89. 788 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
90. Id. at 947; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.10(a),(e) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
91. Petru, 788 S.W.2d at 947.
92. 788 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
93. Id. at 649-50.
94. Id. at 650.
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cause of the admission of improper evidence.9" The court held that
questions asked of the child on the videotape shown to the jury were im-
permissably leading,96 that the experts' testimony as to their opinion that the
child was truthful was inadmissable, 97 and that certain hearsay testimony of
statements made by the child were also inadmissable. 98
In In Interest of A.B.B. 99 the Texas Department of Human Services
(TDHS) lost custody of A.B.B. and the trial court ordered the child returned
to its mother.leG The TDHS petitioned for a review of its placement of the
child with its maternal grandparents in accordance with the Family Code. °10
TDHS had been granted temporary custody of the child following the child's
second hospitalization for injuries he received in his home. TDHS placed the
child with his maternal grandparents as foster parents and requested that its
conservatorship appointment be terminated and that the maternal grandpar-
ents be made permanent managing conservators. After a hearing, the trial
court ordered that the temporary conservatorship be terminated and that the
child be returned to his mother.10 2 When TDHS appealed this decision, the
appellate court held that it had jurisdiction to hear this type of appeal.10 3
The court also found that because the parents were not indigent, TDHS was
not liable for the guardian ad litem fee even though it had initiated the
suit."°4 The court then reviewed the evidence and held that while the evi-
dence was conflicting, the trial court should be accorded discretion in deter-
mining the best interest of the child.' 05 Thus, the court determined that
there had been no abuse of discretion and that the child should be returned
to his mother.106
In Skidmore v. Glenn 107 the court held that a father could not withdraw
his consent to a visitation agreement after the trial court had orally rendered
judgment.108 The judgment was rendered on June 30, 1988 and signed on
January 18, 1989, in response to a motion by the mother to enter an order.
The father filed a response to that motion in which he attempted to revoke
his agreement. The court denied this revocation.
In Wittie v. Skees 109 the Houston appellate court held that the father who
timely requested a jury trial in his suit for a modification of custody would
95. Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d 949, 959-60 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied).
96. Id. at 956.
97. Id. at 956-58.
98. Id. at 959.
99. 785 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
100. Id.
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 18.01 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
102. In re A.B.B., 785 S.W.2d at 830.
103. Id. at 831.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In re A.B.B., 785 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ). It may be
that this was the right decision, but medical witnesses testified that it was statistically "un-
likely, but possible" that the injuries sustained by the child were the result of an accident. Id.
107. 781 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
108. Id. at 675.
109. 786 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
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be accorded his day in court since the trial court's denial of his request was
reversed and remanded.' 10 The court held that the father made the request
within a reasonable time and that in this case, where less than six weeks had
elapsed between the filing and the trial, the delay necessary for assembling a
jury would not unduly burden the trial court."1
In re Cassey D. "12 concerned a profoundly handicapped five-year-old child
and the right of visitation by her mother and an adult good friend. Because
of all her medical problems, Galveston County Protective Services (GCPS)
was named the child's temporary managing conservator. The mother and
the adult friend lived in the Galveston area and while Cassey was hospital-
ized there, the adult friend came to know her and became her friend. When
the court ordered that Cassey be placed in a health care facility in Dallas, it
became difficult for the mother, as well as the friend, to visit during the
limited and rigidly enforced visiting hours. The mother and the friend
moved for entry of an order granting them reasonable visitation and access
to the child.
The trial court, while denying the friend standing to be named a posses-
sory conservator, also found that doing so would not be in the child's best
interest. 1 3 The trial court also refused to grant the mother specific visita-
tion, but instead made visitation rights subject to the discretion of the Man-
aging Conservator (GCPS).114 The appellate court declined to consider the
standing issue and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to find that
appointing the friend as possessory conservator was not in the child's best
interest.115
The appellete court held that a parent had a right to visitation and that
such right should not be denied except in the extreme case of an unfit par-
ent.116 This was not the case here, and the court held that an institution's
visitation policies should not have a controlling effect over the requirements
of the Family Code. 1 7 The court then, in order to expedite the resolution of
the matter, ordered a mediation proceeding to determine the parties' rights
of access." 8
In Fair v. Davis 119 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's modifica-
tion of the father's visitation schedule. 20 The court held that it was not
necessary to prove a positive imprbvement in connection with the change
and that the mother had met the burden of proving change of circumstances
as well as the children's best interest. 121 The court noted that the paternal
110. Id. at 465-66.
111. Id. at 466.
112. 783 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
113. Id. at 594.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 595-96.
116. In re Cassey D., 783 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, no writ).
117. Id. at 597.
118. Id. at 598.
119. 787 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id. at 428-29.
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grandparents in the original order had been granted the right to exercise
periods of visitation in lieu of the father as well as visitation periods of their
own, and since the father might be leaving the state, it would be the grand-
parents' visitation that would be reduced.' 22 The court, however, held that
there was evidence to support the jury's finding and approved the
reduction. 123
In Tope v. Kaminski 124 the grandparents won access in the trial court, but
the appellate court reversed and rendered.' 25 The wife filed a divorce peti-
tion in 1983. The grandparents intervened and the court granted them ac-
cess. In 1987, however, the parties, having reconciled, nonsuited the
divorce. The grandparents then filed an original petition seeking access or
managing conservatorship, asserting that one or more of the children had
been abused.
The case went to trial and at its end the judge denied the grandparents
managing conservatorship because he was not convinced that the children
had been abused and stated he would conduct a hearing concerning the en-
try of judgment. 126 After considerable delay, the judge found that the
grandparents had standing and granted them access.' 27 The appellate court
reversed, reasoning that in order for grandparents to have court ordered ac-
cess to children of an ongoing marriage, there had to be a finding of abuse by
the parents in addition to the best interest of the children test.' 28
The problem of who has jurisdiction over decisions concerning the cus-
tody of children in an interstate context has not been solved. The federal
courts, even under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),129 do
not have jurisdiction to decide these issues.' 30 In addition to the PKPA, the
states have each enacted some version of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA).' 31 The Texas Family Code provides that if the man-
aging conservator and the children have lived in another state for six
months, the Texas court may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction unless
there has been a written agreement.132
In Huffstutlar v. Koons133 this section was dispositive and the court
granted the mother, an Oklahoma resident, a writ of mandamus compelling
122. Id. at 430.
123. Id.
124. 793 S.W.2d 315 (rex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ granted).
125. Id. at 317.
126. Id. at 316.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 316-17. In further support of its holding, the court pointed out that the Topes,
as parents of their children, were fighting to retain control. Id. at 317.
129. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1990).
130. In Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1988), the Court held that when
Congress enacted the PKPA no new federal cause of action was created. Id. In Thompson v.
Sundholm, 726 F. Supp. 147, 149 (S.D. Tex. 1989), the court held that in accordance with the
Supreme Court's ruling, it did not have jurisdiction over a custody dispute.
131. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-75 (Vernon 1986). Each state may have a
slightly different version of the Act, so if a dispute cannot be settled based on the Texas statute,
for example, it is then necessary to look at the other state's statute.
132. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(d) (Vernon 1986).
133. 789 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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the trial judge to grant her request for a writ of habeas corpus so that she
might retrieve her child.134 The appellate court held that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the motion to modify had been
ffied after the child and the managing conservator had established a new
home state. 135 In Hemingway v. Robertson 3 6 the court denied a writ of
mandamus in a case involving visitation, child support, and attorneys'
fees. 137 The court agreed that Indiana, the new home state, had jurisdiction
over custody disputes, but then went on to hold that visitation was not the
same as custody, and therefore the Texas court could continue to retain ju-
risdiction over questions of access.138 The court did point out, however, that
it might be better for one court to decide questions of custody and access and
that the Texas court could defer to the Indiana court.139 With regard to
payment of support and attorneys' fees, these issues required personal juris-
diction and the Texas court retained jurisdiction over them.140
In Viggiano v. Emerson '4 ' the appellate court denied a petition for a writ
of mandamus because the court had not yet determined which state had
jurisdiction.142 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court could issue
an injunction prohibiting the removal of the children from certain Texas
counties. 143
Attorneys' fees in connection with custody and visitation can give rise to
disputes. In Miericke v. Lemoine 14 the Dallas court of appeals held, over a
dissenting opinion, that it could hear an appeal concerning attorneys' fees in
connection with writ of habeas corpus that was not appealable. 145 In Ex
Parte Shields 146 the appellate court held a wife in contempt for disobeying a
134. Id. at 708.
135. Id. at 714. In Caplan v. Daggett, 784 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, no writ), the court used the same reasoning to grant a mother living in California a
writ of mandamus directing the district judge to vacate a judgment that modified a child cus-
tody order.
136. 778 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Houston (Ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
137. Id. at 201-02.
138. Id.
139. Id. The concept that visitation is not the same as custody is an interesting one since a
custody determination includes decisions and instructions as to visitation as well as custody.
See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.52(2)(Vemon 1986). The courts appear to be relying on
Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1985), a federal case that has since been
overruled on nonsubstantive grounds by the United States Supreme Court. See supra note 130.
It might be better in these interstate cases if the courts included the PKPA in their reasoning
since the PKPA is controlling in many cases. See supra note 129.
An annotation in 78 A.L.R.4th 1028, 1032-42 (1990) purports to clarfy issues in connec-
tion with conflicts between the PKPA and the UCCJA, but because it relies on various deci-
sions from different states, the annotation fails to be a definitive source.
140. Hemingway v. Robertson, 778 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1989, no writ). In Henry v. Rivera, 783 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ),
the court raised similar questions in connection with a dispute between Texas and Utah. Id. at
767-69. Utah had declined to exercise jurisdiction over visitation and support matters, but that
was not held to be the same as declining jurisdiction over custody. Id. at 769.
141. 794 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
142. Id. at 566-67.
143. Id. at 567.
144. 786 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
145. Id. at 811.
146. 779 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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custody order as well as for not paying attorneys' fees.147 The court cor-
rectly held such action was not imprisonment for debt, since enforcement of
the contempt provisions would be suspended on payment of the fees. 148 In
Sullivan v. Deguerin, Dickson & Szekely 149 the Houston appellate court held
that the issue of attorneys' fees was severable from the issue of modification
of visitation.150 The attorneys' fees had not been appealed, and even though
the court reversed visitation modification, such reversal did not affect the
judgment as to attorneys' fees. 151
IV. SUPPORT
In LaPrade v. LaPrade 15 2 the trial court included in its calculation of the
obligor's net resources the depreciation amounts shown on the trucking
company's income tax statements owned by the obligor.153 The appellate
court affirmed, pointing out that the trial court had broad discretion in de-
termining the amount of child support and could assign a reasonable mone-
tary value of income to assets that were not currently providing income. 154
In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ' 55 a trial court failed to grant a request for
findings with respect to the child support order as mandated by the Family
Code.' 56 The appellate court held that this was error and ordered the trial
court to do so.' 57 The legislature might be wise to require courts to make
these written findings as a matter of routine without the need for a request
from one of the parties.
Orders of a trial court cannot be set aside after such court has lost subject
matter jurisdiction.158 The proper remedy is by bill of review or a collateral
attack at the time of attempted enforcement.1 59
In Koether v. Morgan 160 the appellate court held that in a situation where
there were four children born of the marriage, but only one lived in the
county of the court of original jurisdiction, while the other three lived in
another county, the court of original jurisdiction was required to transfer
jurisdiction to the court in the county where the other three children lived
147. Id. at 100.
148. Id. at 101.
149. 786 S.W.2d 59 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1990, no writ).
150. Id. at 61.
151. Id.
152. 784 S.W.2d 490 flex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
153. Id. at 491.
154. Id. at 493. The court also pointed out that the managing conservator was virtually
unemployable and that the obligor had a large amount of available accounts receivable which
he was apparently not attempting to collect. Id.
155. 788 S.W.2d 455, 455 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.057 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
157. Chamberlain, 788 S.W.2d at 455.
158. See Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
159. Id. at 87. This case involved a clarification order based on an original divorce decree
that had specified that the obligor's employer withhold child support, but did not specifically
require the obligor herself to pay. The decree was later clarified to order the obligor to person-
ally pay the support, but the obligor was not personally served nor did she appear at the
clarification hearing. Id.
160. 787 S.W.2d 582 (rex. App.-Waco 1990, no writ).
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upon receiving a proper transfer motion.161 The court held mandamus
would lie since this was a mandatory ministerial duty based on legislative
intent. 162Transfers from one court to another cannot not be effected sua
sponte, but only upon a motion of one of the parties.1 63
In Escue v. Reed 1" the court reversed and remanded, holding it was an
abuse of discretion, when modifying the amount of support, to follow the
child support guidelines for one child since the trial court knew that the
obligor had to pay support for two children. 165 A trial court's failure to
submit an instruction on net resources to the jury was harmless error be-
cause the charge was framed in terms of findings as to the best interest of the
children along with a material and substantial change in circumstances. 166
Absent any change in circumstances, there can be no reduction in sup-
port.167 Additionally. economic hardships from a remarriage can not be
used as a basis for reducing support to children of a prior marriage. 16 The
Penick court did state, however, that it would be proper to take into consid-
eration the reduction in value of the obligor's non-income producing prop-
erty because it might be necessary for the obligor to sell the property to meet
his support obligations. 169 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded
the judgment.
In Valencia v. Valencia 170 the mother had been made managing conserva-
tor in the original decree and had been granted all right, title, and interest in
the house that had been owned by the parties. The court found the husband
had some $15,000 in equity in the house, and this amount was to be repaid
to him at $100 a month to fulfill his child support obligation. 171 When the
court modified the decree to grant managing conservatorship to the father,
the court found that he was still owed $13,100 for his equity in his former
wife's homestead. 172
Accordingly, the trial court imposed a lien on the homestead for that
amount. 173 The appellate court held that the trial court's order was a nul-
lity, since the mother had been granted clear title to the homestead. 174 The
court did state, however, that while no lien could be imposed, there was
nothing to prevent the court from ordering the mother to pay child
161. Id. at 585.
162. Id.
163. See Johnson v. Pettigrew, 786 S.W.2d 45, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
164. 790 S.W.2d 717 (rex. App.-E1 Paso 1990, no writ).
165. Id. at 720-21. The court did not hold it an abuse of discretion to not deduct from the
obligor's net resources the monthly payments he was making to the IRS because he had in the
past intentionally underpaid his tax obligations. Id.
166. See Fair v. Davis, 787 S.W.2d 422, 427 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); see supra
note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conservatorship aspects of this case.
167. Penick v. Penick, 780 S.W.2d 407 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
168. 780 S.W.2d at 409.
169. Id. at 410.
170. 792 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
171. Id. at 566.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 566-67.




In Lambourn v. Lambourn 176 the ex-wife filed a motion for clarification
and enforcement of an original divorce decree. The agreement incident to
the divorce had contained provisions for life insurance for the benefit of the
couple's minor child until the child reached age twenty-two. The decree
failed to state how the proof of insurance was to be provided, so the trial
court ordered both parties to provide proof of insurance annually and
granted the ex-wife attorneys' fees.177 The appellate court stated that a de-
cree providing for support of a non-disabled child past eighteen was unen-
forceable, and therefore reversed and rendered the judgment of the trial
court.17
8
A strong dissenting opinion noted that the decree did not enforce the or-
der, but merely set an annual date for proof of insurance. 179 The dissent,
relying on Garcia v. Fleming,80 argued that an order for support past age
eighteen was enforceable until the child reached the age of eighteen, and
thereafter it was only voidable.' 8 '
In Cisneros v. Cisneros18 2 the former wife sued for enforcement of arrear-
ages in child support based on the ex-husband's failure to pay the automatic
increases as they came due. Although the ex-husband defended his position
on the basis that automatic increases were unenforceable, the cases he cited
were based on court ordered increases and not on agreements as was the
present case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment and
further held that while the judgment might not comply with the statute, the
ex-husband's attorney had approved the judgment both as to substance and
form, and therefore he had waived any error. 183
In Niles v. Rotherwell184 the appellate court credited the obligor with the
full amount of support he had paid directly to the obligee even though the
original order required him to make his payments through the district
clerk.' 8 5 The obligee appealed and the appellate court affirmed the trial
court, holding that the trial court had the power to do what was in the best
interest of the child and what was fair and equitable.'8 6 The court held that
there was evidence that the direct payments were intended as child support,
and thus by accepting those payments, the obligee waived her right to insist
upon their payment through the registry of the court.18 7 In another arrear-
age case, the trial court gave the obligor credit for the amount he paid to
175. Valencia v. Valencia, 792 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
176. 787 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
177. Id. at 432.
178. Id. at 435.
179. Id. at 433.
180. 323 S.W.2d 152, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. Lambourn, 787 S.W.2d at 435.
182. 787 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
183. Id. at 551-52.
184. 793 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, no writ).
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support one of two children after that child came to live with him. 18 The
appellate court affirmed and also held that the agreement could not be en-
forced on a contractual basis since the agreement did not so provide.189
In Litchfield v. Litchfield 190 the appellate court reversed a denial of a mo-
tion for new trial in connection with a default judgment against a child sup-
port obligor. 91 The court held that the attorney's failure to appear was
neither intentional nor a result of conscious indifference.1 92 The dissent ar-
gued that the trial court did not have to accept the attorney's explanation.193
In Harrell v. Hobbs194 the appellate court held that at the time of the
judgment, the trial court did not have the power to order wage withholding
for child support arrearages after the child had turned eighteen.1 95 The
court, however, did affirm the judgment for arrearages on the presumption
that they had accrued within ten years of the filing of the motion to en-
force.196 In another request for wage withholding, the trial court reduced
the amount of required child support and ordered wage withholding, but
refused to include any amount for payment of arrearages in the withholding
order.197 The appellate court affirmed the trial court despite the Attorney
General's contention that in suits brought by the Attorney General's office,
the withholding for arrearages was mandatory. The appellate court dis-
agreed with the Attorney General's argument, stating that current support
payments were ordered withheld and that a judgment for arrearages had
been granted. 198
In Rovner v. Rovner 199 the trial court refused to hold the ex-husband in
contempt for failure to pay adequate child support because the wording of
the underlying judgment was too vague. 200 At the hearing, the trial court
found that there were some definite amounts required by the order and that
the total payable was less than the amount the ex-husband had paid.201 The
ex-wife appealed claiming that the trial court should have entered a judg-
ment for arrearages. The appellate court disagreed, and held that amounts
represented by the words "all medical, hospitalization and health care costs
... not covered by insurance" and "all tuition, books, room and board re-
lated to the attendance at . .. Woodward Academy" were not sufficiently
188. Rinehold v. Rinehold, 790 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ).
189. Id. at 406.
190. 794 S.W.2d 105 (rex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
191. Id. at 107-08.
192. Id. at 107.
193. Id. at 108-10.
194. 791 S.W.2d 310 (rex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
195. Id. at 312.
196. Id. at 313.
197. See Texas ex reI. Nelson v. Nelson, 783 S.W.2d 635 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1989, writ denied).
198. Id. at 638.
199. 778 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
200. Id. at 906-07.
201. Id. at 907.
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clear to be enforced by a judgment.20 2
The Texas Supreme Court held that in order to enforce child support or-
ders by contempt, the contempt order must be specific, 20 3 it must specify the
time, date, and place of each failure to pay.204 In addition, the obligee must
have the resources to pay,20 5 and the contempt order must be clear as to
whether it is civil or criminal and must specify the method by which it can
be purged. 20 6 There can, of course, be no contempt order after the court has
orally suspended the order upon which it is based. 20 7
In Ex parte Linder20 8 the Dallas court of appeals in a fragmented en banc
decision denied the writ of habeas corpus, although the order on which it
was based required the obligor to pay child support of $250 a month in two
monthly installments of $112.50 each. 20 9 Relying on this order, the court
held that the obligor should have paid at least $112.50 twice a month, and he
had paid nothing.2 10 Additionally, the court did not find the contempt judg-
ment void although it did not affirmatively state that there was a proper
waiver of counsel.211
Habeas corpus will be denied when the obligor voluntarily appears at the
contempt hearing, so that the trial court has jurisdiction despite a lack of ten
days notice. 212 An order of commitment for violation of probation does not
have to be as specific as an original contempt order 21 3 and contempt orders
do not relieve an obligor of the continuing obligation to pay child support.21 4
In Boetscher v. State2 15 a Michigan resident was indicted for the offense of
criminal nonsupport and was extradited to Texas. He had never been in
Texas prior to his extradition. He filed for a writ of habeas corpus which the
202. Id.
203. Ex parte Garcia, 795 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1990).
204. Exparte Holland, 790 S.W.2d 568, 568 (Tex. 1990) (enforcement orders must contain
specific findings of time, date, and place of noncompliance); Ex parte Duncan, 795 S.W.2d 10,
10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (order invalid where time, date, and place of noncom-
pliance not set out); Exparte Haynie, 793 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, no writ) (enforcement orders must contain specific time, date, and place of occurrence
for which contempt is sought); Ex parte Greene, 788 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (contempt order void on due process grounds absent statutory
requirement of specific time, date, and place of each instance of noncompliance); Ex parte
Johnson, 778 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (commitment
order void on its face which does not set out with particularity any dates of noncompliance
with court order).
205. Exparte Mabry 792 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
206. Ex parte Mitchell, 783 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1989, no writ).
207. Ex parte Cole, 778 S.W.2d 599, 600-01 ('rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no
writ).
208. 783 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
209. Id. at 756-57.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 759.
212. Ex parte Waldrep, 783 S.W.2d 332, 334 ('ex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ).
213. Ex parte Cuellar, 791 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ).
214. Ex parte Malone, 788 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no
writ).
215. 782 S.W.2d 954, 960 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, pet. granted).
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court denied.2 16 The Court of Criminal Appeals has not yet ruled on State v.
Paiz2 17 which is a similar case that was also decided by an Amarillo court.
After reading most of the above cases, it should be clear that the courts
are being harassed by obligors, mostly fathers, who are trying to use every
loophole, real or imagined, to avoid paying their rightful child support obli-
gation. On the other hand, it appears that there are also obligees, mostly
mothers, who are trying to use the letter of the law, real or imagined, to
obtain payments of support that have already been paid or are far in excess
of that which is owed.
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Attorney General has ruled that state employees who adopt a child
under three years of age are entitled to the same amount of sick leave that
would be necessary to recover from pregnancy and childbirth.218 The lan-
guage is gender neutral so the leave can be used by either or both adoptive
parents.
In Works v. Arlington Memorial Hospital219 the adoptive parents lost a
negligence suit in behalf of their adopted child against a hospital because
there was no proximate cause. The court held that summary judgment for
the hospital was proper when all the evidence showed that the hospital had
discharged the baby with its natural mother.220 After the discharge had
been completed, the mother turned the baby over to an attorney's represen-
tative who then placed the baby with a couple who later abused it. The
court held that the hospital could not have foreseen the danger to the
baby.221
In In re McAda 222 the Amarillo appellate court held that the statutory
scheme for privately placing a child for adoption was not unconstitu-
tional.223 The mother had signed an affidavit of relinquishment that was
irrevocable for sixty days and during that time a court decree terminated her
parent-child relationship. The court noted that constitutional rights may be
waived if the waiver is voluntary and knowing as it was in this case.2 24 The
court dismissed the mother's other contentions as being misplaced since they
related to the adoption process.2 25 The court reasoned that after the parent-
child relationship has been terminated, the natural mother is not a proper
party in the adoption action.2 26
In Broyles v. Ashworth 227 the Fort Worth appellate court granted manda-
216. Id. at 955.
217. 777 S.W.2d 575 ('ex. App.-Amarillo 1989, pet. granted).
218. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1203 (1990).
219. 782 S.W.2d 309 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
220. Id. at 314.
221. Id.
222. 780 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
223. Id. at 311.
224. Id. at 310.
225. Id. at 311-12.
226. Id. at 312.
227. 782 S.W.2d 31 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
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mus in a case arising from a California natural mother's attempt to effect the
return of her child after a parent-child relationship termination proceed-
ing.228 The mother asked for a new trial, which the trial court granted, and
then for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court also granted.229 The trial
court granted the permanent managing conservatorship to the potential
adoptive parents after the original parent-child relationship proceeding. 230
When the trial court granted a new trial, however, their status changed to
temporary managing conservators. 231 At this point, the natural mother
claimed she was a sending agency under the Interstate Compact for the
Placement of Children 232 and had an absolute right to possession of the
child.233 The trial court agreed, but the appellate court pointed out that
because there was no showing of California law, it was presumed that Cali-
fornia law was the same as Texas law.234 The court held therefore that the
natural mother could not prevail because the potential adoptive parents had
a right to possession under a valid court order.235
A distinction exists between parent-child relationship termination suits be-
tween private parties and suits between the state and a private party. The
United States Supreme Court has not held that an attorney should be ap-
pointed to represent parents in private suits, but it has held that in state
versus parent termination suits, the question of appointed representation
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 236 The interpretation of the Texas
statute pertaining to appointed representation in parent-child relationship
termination suits237 is a matter for the Texas courts, and two courts during
the past year came to opposite conclusions. In Baird v. Harris238 the Dallas
appellate court held that the statute applied only to suits between the state
and an indigent parent,239 while the court in Odoms v. Batts240 held that the
statute applied to all suits involving indigent parents. 241 If this latter inter-
pretation stands, there may be pressure for the legislature to enact more stat-
utes providing appointed counsel for indigent parties in suits other than just
the parent-child relationship.
In Yepma v. Stephens242 the appellate court reversed and rendered a judg-
ment terminating the parent-child relationship of a father based on failure to
support the child in accordance with his ability.243 The court held that the
228. Id. at 32.
229. Id. at 32-33.
230. Id. at 32.
231. Id.
232. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. § 45.021 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
233. Broyles v. Ashworth, 782 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
234. Broyles, 782 S.W.2d at 34.
235. Id.
236. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
237. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(d) (Vernon 1986).
238. 778 S.W.2d 147 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
239. Id. at 148-49.
240. 791 S.W.2d 677 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
241. Id. at 678-79.
242. 779 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
243. Id. at 512.
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period of nonsupport began no sooner than eighteen months prior to the
filing of the suit and since, in this case, the father was incarcerated during
most of the period, a finding that the father had the ability to pay was not
supported by the evidence. 244 In Little v. Garza245 a natural father was able
to resist a non-relative adoption by a court determination that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that he failed to support -his daughter in
accordance with his ability.246 His victory, however, may not be permanent
since the case was remanded for a new trial.247
In Ivy v. Edna Gladney Home248 a putative father who had signed an
Affidavit of A Waiver of Interest in Child 249 appealed the judgment termi-
nating his parental rights. The appellate court affirmed the decision and af-
ter patiently negating each of the father's six points of error, sustained the
procedure that had been used in this case and continues to be used to enable
adoption agencies to place children quickly and efficiently. 250
In Williams v. Texas Department of Human Services251 the court reversed
an order terminating the mother's parent-child relationship because there
was no clear and convincing evidence to establish that she had engaged in
conduct endangering the child. 252 The child had been in the custody of the
mother's aunt and uncle since 1985. The mother did not challenge the cus-
tody arrangements but was now appealing to retain her parental rights. The
mother had only had possession of the child for the first two months of its
life and the state did not prove that the child had been endangered during
that time.
2 5 3
In Howard v. Texas Department of Human Services254 the court reversed
and remanded a decision terminating the parent-child relationship of a
mother and her children because the attorney who was appointed ad litem
for the children had previously represented the mother in a motion to mod-
ify conservatorship. 255 The appellate court held that although there might
be enough evidence to support the court's decision, termination of parental
rights was irrevocable and a trial adjudicating these rights must be able to
withstand careful scrutiny.256
Texas courts affirmed termination of parental rights by the Texas Depart-
ment of Human Resources in five different cases of child abuse. In two
cases, the parent did not directly cause physical abuse but permitted it to
happen.257 In two other cases the children were sexually abused and the
244. Id.
245. 787 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
246. Id. at 604.
247. Id.
248. 783 S.W.2d 829 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
249. TEX. FAM. CODE AN. § 15.041 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
250. Ivy, 783 S.W.2d at 831-34.
251. 788 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
252. Id. at 927-28.
253. Id. at 927.
254. 791 S.W.2d 313 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
255. Id. at 315-16.
256. Id. at 316.
257. See Mason v. Dallas County Child Welfare, 794 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. App.-Dallas
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mothers did not prevent it,258 and in the fifth case both parents' rights were
terminated because the father had sexually abused the children and the
mother had not prevented it.259
Most of these children whose relationships with their parents have been
terminated will be placed for adoption. These children have been abused
and will probably be classified as hard to place. The case of Griffith v. John-
ston260 is important in this connection, even though the court has denied
that any constitutional rights of the parents were abridged by the state's
failure to inform the adoptive parents of the children's prior treatment.261
The publicity arising from the case has informed the public of the problem
and has created considerable public concern. The legislature, perhaps as a
result of the publicity, has by statute increased the state's duty to record
information and make it available to potential adoptive parents. 262 One may
expect that in the future the children involved in cases similar to those above
will benefit from the information made available to their potential adoptive
parents.
1990, no writ) (danger to physical or emotional well being of child caused when "parent know-
ingly places child with persons who engage in endangering conduct"); see also Garza v. Texas
Dept. of Human Servs., 794 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)
(mother's parental rights properly terminated where she knowingly permitted children to be
exposed to endangering conditions).
258. See In re J.L.S., 793 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)
(mother's failure to come to sexually abused child's aid resulted in termination of her parental
rights); see also Lakes v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 791 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1990, no writ) (mother who acknowledged her child had been sexually abused but
failed to remove child from endangered conditions lost parental rights).
259. Posner v. Dallas County Child Welfare, 784 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1990, writ denied).
260. 899 F.2d 1427, 1437-41 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991).
261. Id. at 1441.
262. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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